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Abstract: American recently declassified records give evidence that Qaddafi did not meet any significant 
opposition from the Nixon Administration during his first years in power. Washington had realised that 
producers had acquired control of their natural resources, and only pursued continued access to Middle 
Eastern energy sources. Moreover, all Western capitals hoped that the young dictator would turn into a 
stronghold against Russian influence in the area at issue. After all, US companies had not been expelled 
from Libya, whose market was growing more and more towards Western Europe. In a few words, each 
time policy makers suggested a course of action rather hostile to Tripoli, this option was always excluded 
as non profitable to American interests. All this shows that the Nixon Administration was trying to 
“contain” the Libyan regime, at the same time building a dam against the Soviets, who were the real 
target of Nixon’s Twin Pillars Policy.                                        
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Introduction 
     
In the late 1950s, huge oil fields had been discovered in Libya, which thus had become 
one of the major world exporters. Such a performance was due to geographical, 
chemical, and juridical factors. In short, the geographical location of the North African 
country implied an extreme simplicity to transport the black gold, especially after the 
closure of the Suez Canal, due to the 1967 war in the Middle East. Moreover, Libya’s 
proximity to European shores allowed to market the raw material in a few days. Apart 
from that, Libyan oil had a very low level of sulphur, which permitted a quicker and less 
polluting refining process.1 Finally, Libyan concessions were completely different from 
traditional ones. First of all, the 1955 legislation provided high incentives to companies 
speeding up drilling and extractions. Then, the national territory had been divided into 
                                                 
* This work is based on NARA records RG59 A1 5677, declassified through the Freedom of Information 
Act. 
1 See J.M. BLAIR, The Control of Oil, New York, Vintage Books, 1978, p. 211. 
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four zones: two of them in the North and along the coast, and two more in the South and 
in the desert. Royalties amounted to twelve per cent and profits were equally divided 
between companies and the government. Nevertheless, though the concessionaries 
enjoyed the highest freedom of action on industrial policies, the law specified that 
within five years they would give back a quarter of the area previously assigned. Such a 
complex structure had been projected in order to prevent any subject from assuming a 
monopoly position and to give the Government a wide room to manoeuvre and always 
be able to assign areas to those bidding more.2 The outcome of such a policy was that 
oil in Libya was managed not so much by the majors, but rather by independent 
companies. Therefore, it was impossible for the majors not to see with suspicion the 
policy of price reduction and the growing inflow into the market of a kind of first class 
and easy to transport oil. The independents, most of which did not have any other 
concession around the world, owned more than fifty percent of the national production 
and their competition had become so strong, that the majors’ estimates showed a certain 
concern about the future, since they predicted that almost eighty per cent of the output 
increase would be due to independent companies.3   
     Most Libyan production was controlled by American companies and it is not 
surprising that the African country played quite an important role in Washington’s 
Mediterranean and Middle East policy. After all, the Americans interpreted their 
presence in Libya as a natural consequence of the military, economic and political 
relations established after the second global conflict. Both the United States and the 
United Kingdom had always supported Idris Sanusi’s leadership by providing him 
financial assistance and technical and administrative aid and know how. In exchange of 
that, the British had kept their military presence in el-Aden and Tobruk and the 
Americans had built an air force base in Wheelus Field. However, London had been 
soon obliged to limit its foreign commitments due to the post-war financial crisis, thus 
leaving Washington practically alone in assisting the Libyan monarchy. At the time of 
the 1969 coup, American oil interests in Libya were estimated in over five billion 
                                                 
2 See M. CRICCO, Il petrolio dei Senussi: Stati Uniti e Gran Bretagna in Libia dall’indipendenza a 
Gheddafi (1949-1973), Firenze, Edizioni Polistampa, 2002, pp. 84-85. 
3 See BLAIR, The Control of Oil, pp. 216-218. 
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dollars, with a positive repercussion on the balance of payments amounting to six 
hundred million annually.4 Almost to testify the relevant importance of this country 
during the first years of the Qaddafi regime, not all records have been declassified yet. 
During a period of research at the National Archives in 2011, the undersigned applied 
for a whole box of first hand documents through a complex Freedom of Information Act 
procedure lasting more than two years. Finally, in early 2014 it was possible to ship the 
afore mentioned set of records to the undersigned’s address. The present work does not 
aim at reconstructing events of that span of time, which has been already done in several 
other occasions, but only at completing what already written and interpreted, by filling 
some evidence gaps, previously inevitable, through the new documentation acquired.                     
     
1.  The End of the Sanusi Regime 
On April 22, 1965, a US National Intelligence Estimate asserted that the conservative 
regime of King Idris of Libya would be probably carry on being relatively stable and 
pro-Western oriented. However, in case of domestic pressures fomented by Arab 
nationalism the monarchy itself might not long survive. The country had become a 
major oil producer and the massive inflow of revenues was creating serious problems, 
especially as regarded the gap between the rich and the poor. Nevertheless, the CIA was 
quite optimistic by affirming that nationalisation of the oil industry would be unlikely 
under any regime.5 However, according to Ronald Bruce St John the King was never so 
pro-West as many observers believed. Rather, the King’s approach was based on the 
belief that Europeans and Americans were in the best position to guarantee Libyan 
security. In light of this, Western political values and structures were not absorbed, 
while the non aligned position was emphasised. Ironically, oil exploitation freed Libya 
from a kind of dependence from the West, but developed another one. In fact, in order 
to take advantage of this natural resource, the country needed to attract the necessary 
                                                 
4 See L. TONDO, La politica dell’amministrazione Nixon verso la Libia di Gheddafi (1969-1972), in 
«Clio», XLIV, 4, ottobre-dicembre 2008, pp. 610-611.  
5 See National Intelligence Estimate: Libya, April 22, 1965, NIE 36.5-65, Secret, Controlled Dissem, in 
D.S. PATTERSON (gen. ed.) - N.D. HOWLAND (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968 
(thereafter FRUS), vol. XXIV, Africa, Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1995, 
pp. 107-108.     
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technicians and technology, and this could be only done under the umbrella of foreign 
oil companies.6 Despite all this, the newly declassified records give further evidence 
that Libya was the only African country applying the Arab boycott against the Jewish 
State well before the Six Days’ War, which also affected US interests, by including for 
example Ford and its subsidiaries’ products.7 A document like this can do nothing but 
show that the Middle Eastern powder keg undermined American interests in 
traditionally Western-oriented conservative regimes as well. In order to better realise 
how promising the Libyan market was for the West, we had better have a look at the 
Export Market Guide of the US Department of Commerce, stating that in 1965 Libya 
had been the third largest customer for American goods in the whole African continent 
and the need for goods and services of all types was growing proportionally with the 
ever-increasing oil revenues.8 
     At the outbreak of the June War, an energy crisis was not part of the main Western 
powers’ political agenda, since Western Europe still had good strategic reserves and the 
Americans had augmented production. Moreover, despite the obstruction of the Suez 
Canal obviously limited oil inflow from the Persian Gulf, the tanker fleet was perfectly 
able to carry the raw material by circumnavigating Africa, while another major producer 
like Venezuela had increased output as well.9 Free market laws were still favourable to 
consumers and this bore a general atmosphere of optimism, on grounds also of intra-
Arab rivalries. In those days, American interests in Libya were thus summarised by the 
State Department: a) Wheelus base militarily important and not to be abandoned, in 
order not to jeopardise other US interests in that country and elsewhere in Arab world; 
b) close cooperation with Tripoli to reduce vulnerability of the base to the minimum; c) 
necessity to avoid any action which might further arouse Arab passions against the US 
                                                 
6 See R.B. ST JOHN, Libya: From Colony to Revolution, Oxford, Oneworld Publications, 2012, pp. 120-
121.  
7 See John F. Root to Mr. Dobyns: Arab Boycott – Effect on Importation of Personal Effects into Libya, 
March 14, 1967, in NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION (thereafter NARA), Record 
Group (thereafter RG) 59, A1 5677, Records Relating to Libya, 1966-1973, box 6, FT 11, Quantitative 
Restrictions and Controls, 1967 Libya, Limited Official Use.   
8 See Help Build New Libya, in «Export Market Guide», US Department of Commerce/Bureau of 
International Commerce, Tripoli International Trade Fair, February 28 - March 20, 1967.  
9 See F. VENN, The Oil Crisis, Edinburgh, Pearson Education Limited, 2002, p. 75.     
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and prejudice American oil interests.10 From newly declassified records we can well 
understand how double-edged independent oil companies were for the American stake. 
In fact, it was exactly through them that the Libyan Government tried to “blackmail” 
Washington. As an example of that, we know that representatives of the Oasis Oil 
Company, one of the major producers in the country, had been approached by 
government officials stating that their position would be jeopardised if they did not 
pressure the White House to take a position satisfactory to Libya in the United Nations 
General Assembly. To this the State Department replied that the Libyan request of 
withdrawal from Wheelus Base was in diplomatic channels, but no assumption had to 
be delivered as regarded manner and timing. In any case, the Administration did not 
exclude the option to withdraw and oil executives on the spot had to be informed about 
that.11 Despite British and European energy vulnerability and the opinion that it would 
be profitable to improve diplomatic relations with oil producers and Arab States in 
general, Arab nationalism had by then conquered hearts and minds of the younger 
generations. The Libyan monarchy, they accused, was isolated from the rest of the Arab 
world, but they were also building a national identity contrary to any foreign hegemony 
on Libyan economic resources, though they always appreciated trading partnerships.12 
After all, despite the undoubtedly positive position the Soviet Union was acquiring in 
the Middle East, the American Administration believed the threat of Nasserisation in 
Libya could be kept remote, while no dramatic change on Wheelus base was expected. 
Finally, the Department of State stressed the importance to obtain Congressional 
approval to the resumption of arms sales to friendly Arab countries, among which Libya 
was of paramount importance, since it could afford to purchase everything in cash.13 In 
return of that, King Idris wanted to know exactly what America would do to defend his  
 
                                                 
10 See Telegram 210639 from the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya, June 13, 1967, in NARA, 
RG 59, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA-US, Secret, Immediate, Limdis. 
11 See Briefing Memorandum from Joseph Palmer to Mr. Rostow: Your Appointment with Mr. J.D. 
Anderson, Oasis Oil Company, 3 p.m., June 19, June 19, 1967, in NARA, RG 59, A1 5677, box 6, PET 6 
Companies, 1967 Libya, Limited Official Use. 
12 See CRICCO, Il petrolio dei Senussi, pp. 141-142. 
13 See Information Memorandum from Albert Post to Mr. Palmer: Meeting with Oil Company 
Representatives, August 24, 1967, August 25, 1967, in NARA, RG 59, A1 5677, box 6, PET 6 Companies, 
1967 Libya, Confidential.  
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country in case of foreign attack, but Washington was not certainly eager to undertake 
any entangling commitment, as the Ambassador merely reminded the sovereign that the 
Administration would consult with Tripoli and other friendly governments, which 
primarily meant Britain, in case Libyan security was threatened. To this purpose, the 
existence of military facilities in the Mediterranean country would help achieve this 
goal. However, for the Americans an outright military attack was less likely than 
internal subversion and because of that the government had to strengthen its ability to 
collect and assess information on domestic security.14            
     By analysing oil companies’ records, we can easily realise how pivotal Libyan oil 
was for the Americans. First of all, it was very cheap to produce, not much more than 
Kuwaiti oil, which cost between five and ten cents a barrel. Compared with American 
crude, whose production price was fixed at 1.70 dollars, everybody understands why 
that country was getting more and more important. Costs were kept at a minimum for 
several factors: structures were very deep and each well had a large production. Up to 
then, there had been very few dry holes, exploration and development periods had been 
very short,15 and the crude was very competitive on the European market, due to a very 
low sulphur content and a very high gravity.16 As an outcome of that, on completion of 
the Occidental’s pipeline, in Spring 1968 Libyan oil production had overcome that of 
Kuwait, and was also expected to pass the Iranian and Saudi ones by the end of the 
same year, thus making the North African country the second largest exporter in the 
world. As concerned this, the United States Government expected some trouble with the 
two allies, especially with Iran, as the Shah was being exigent in his demands for 
                                                 
14 See Memorandum of Conversation, August 30, 1967, in NARA, RG 59, Central Files, POL Libya-US, 
Secret.  
15 By 1961, ten valuable fields had already been found and four years later Libya controlled about ten per 
cent of global exports. See F. BRENCHLEY, Britain and the Middle East: An Economic History 1945-87, 
London, Lester Crook Academic Publishing, 1989, pp. 160.     
16 See Occidental Developments, December 20, 1967, in NARA, RG 59, A1 5677, box 6, PET 6 
Companies, Occidental Petroleum, Confidential. 
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greater oil production.17 The second producer in Libya was the Oasis Group, which 
managed to export 700,000 barrels a day and hoped to complete another pipeline.18    
     It is evident that Libya had become a special market for independent companies. The 
majors did not rely on the Mediterranean country’s production, but by then too many 
smaller enterprises with an exclusive stake there were involved in the US balance of 
payments. Though conscious that in case of another war against the Jewish State the 
Arabs would again implement an oil embargo, the Americans relied that the main 
exporters had such strong ties with the West, that they would not harm a safe source of 
revenue for themselves. As regarded Libya, the Americans knew that the monarchy was 
not so stable, being the King rather old and with an heir to the throne considered as 
totally unfit to rule. However, they were confident that the country’s finances depended 
so much on oil, that no change of government would ever imply a stop to oil flow 
towards the United States.19 Ironically, Qaddafi’s first public proclaim after the 
September 1 coup had the effect to calm down the Nixon Administration and the Wilson 
Government in the United Kingdom. In fact, the day after the military’s seizure of 
power Henry Kissinger received a memorandum stating that the new leader’s words had 
been quite moderate, compared with Arab standards, especially because he had not 
mentioned any solidarity to the Palestinian cause. As a consequence, for the moment it 
did not seem that the American stake in Libya was in jeopardy.20 Since the very 
beginning, Qaddafi’s version of Arab nationalism was based on a glorification of Arab 
history and culture viewing the Arab speaking world as one nation where Libya was the  
 
                                                 
17 See Memorandum from John F. Root to Mr. Palmer: Presidential Message to GOL on Completion of 
Occidental’s Petroleum’s Pipeline, April 23, 1968, in NARA, RG 59, A1 5677, box 6, PET 6 Companies, 
Occidental Petroleum, Limited Official Use. 
18 See Memorandum of Conversation: Continental Activities in Libya, October 31, 1968, in NARA, RG 59, 
A1 5677, box 6, Libya, Petroleum/General, Limited Official Use. 
19 See Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency: Prospects for US Access to World Oil 
over the Next 15 Years or so, August 28, 1969, Secret, in E.C. KEEFER (gen. ed.) – L. QAIMMAQAMI (ed.), 
FRUS 1969-1976, vol. XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969-1974, Washington, D.C., United States Government 
Printing Office, 2011, doc. 8, pp. 25-35. 
20 See Memorandum from Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the Special Assistant 
to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Lake) for the President’s Assistant for National 
Security Affairs (Kissinger), September 2, 1969, Secret, in E.C. KEEFER (gen. ed.) - M.L. BELMONTE 
(ed.), FRUS 1969-1976, vol. E-5, Documents on North Africa, 1969-1972, part 2, US Department of State, 
2007, doc. 37, in www.state.gov.   
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custodian of all values, and therefore the vanguard. The young leader laid the blame for 
the existing situation on four centuries of Ottoman stagnation, the exploitation of 
colonialism and then of modern imperialism and the corruption of monarchical rule. 
According to him, for all these reasons Arab people had been reduced to almost 
complete lack of affiliation to the twentieth century world. Hence, at the core of his 
approach to Arab nationalism there was the belief that Arab people had the right and 
were perfectly able to manage their own natural resources. Moreover, for him freedom 
embodied three different and linked to one another concepts: a) emancipation of the 
individual from poverty, ignorance, and injustice; b) liberation of the Homeland from 
imperialism and reactionary forces; c) economic, political, and social emancipation of 
the whole Arab world.21       
     Kissinger himself writes that he did not see any immediate threat to Washington’s oil 
interests, though this was possible in case of renewed hostilities in the Middle East. 
However, the former National Security Advisor reminds us that in that moment the 
American strategy aimed at establishing working relations with the new regime, as the 
balance of payments and the safety of oil investments were regarded as national primary 
interests.22 As concerned the Europeans, Kissinger also highlights that, while in 1950 
Europe’s energy needs mostly relied on coal, twenty years later the Old World’s 
dependence on oil amounted to sixty per cent of all energy consumption. On grounds of 
that, as long as the new radical republics did not jeopardise the West’s access to 
hydrocarbon resources, industrial democracies had no intention to defend decadent 
friendly monarchies.23 On what concerned the military’s attitude towards oil companies, 
American policy makers knew they would be rather strict. A CIA memorandum of 
September 16 warned that Tripoli might follow the same path as two other radical 
States, such as Iraq and Algeria. The latter had reacted to the 1967 conflict by putting 
the companies working there under government control. In a few words, the situation  
 
                                                 
21 See R.B. ST JOHN, Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife, Philadelphia, University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2002, pp. 89-90.   
22 See H.A. KISSINGER, Years of Upheaval, Boston, MA, Toronto, Little, Brown and Company, 1982, p. 
860. 
23 See ibid., pp. 860-861. 
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was such that it was not possible to exclude that Libya might become the champion of 
Arab unity.24 This was also due to Libya’s particularly positive posture in the world oil 
market. At the time of the revolution, in fact, the North African country had become the 
largest producer in the black continent, with an average production of approximately 
three million barrels a day, exported to more than twenty countries. Most competitors in 
Libya had established their own distribution system and personnel. Therefore, some 
companies as well believed that the new rulers had no reason not to honour the 
commitments previously undertaken.25  
     However, after a few weeks it was clear to American authorities that the Libyan 
Arab Republic would at least put pressure on companies to gain higher profits, thus 
influencing OPEC as well. Washington had understood that the Revolutionary Command 
Council was perfectly able to implement the nationalisation of the oil industry. In case 
of joint action by Libya and Iraq leading to an embargo,26 the Department of State 
warned that not even the whole Persian Gulf output would be able to compensate such a 
loss. Despite everything, what was already technically possible was not regarded as 
politically likely, since American analysts thought that Tripoli would be simply satisfied 
by gaining higher revenues.27 Washington could not ignore that the recent events had 
modified the main powers’ oil relations and this inevitably involved the Atlantic 
superpower more and more in international disputes. Since Europe heavily relied on the 
resources of a country which had jumped into the radical field, the United States was 
obliged to prevent Libya from being oriented towards the Soviet Union. This situation 
had the risk to exacerbate the situation not only with the majors, but also with 
conservative Middle Eastern monarchies, thus swinging energy relations from 
                                                 
24 See Intelligence Memorandum – Implications of the Libyan Coup: Some Initial Thoughts, September 
16, 1969, Secret, in FRUS 1969-1976, vol. E-5, part 2, doc. 39, in www.state.gov. 
25 See Chappaqua Oil Corporation: Preliminary Prospectus, October 2, 1969, in NARA, RG 59, A1 5677, 
box 6, PET 15-2, Nationalizations, Libya, Chappaqua Oil Corp. 
26 Despite sympathy to the positions of Iraq, Qaddafi’s Islamic orientation did not allow the Libyan 
regime to share Baghdad’s proclivity for cultivating friendly relations with Moscow and tolerating local 
communists. See G. LENCZOWSKI, The Oil-Producing Countries, in «Daedalus», CIV, 4, The Oil Crisis: 
In Perspective, Fall 1975, p. 64.   
27 See Memorandum from William D. Brewer to Mr. Sisco: Implications of Libyan Coup for World Oil 
Industry, October 2, 1969, in NARA, A-1 5666, Records Relating to the Persian Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula, 1952-1975, box 3, Economic Affairs, General, Secret. 
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accomodationist to confrontationist. Above all, until then the accomodationist policy 
had allowed the traditional regimes in the area to rely on the Anglo-American power to 
help safeguard them from radical overthrow, from without or within. Therefore, 
acquiescence in Qaddafi’s coup could remove this assumption and the main reason for 
producers’ deference to the West.28  
     To tell the truth, according to recently declassified records there was no particular 
reason to justify the Administration’s optimism. Since the very beginning, the military 
junta made life difficult for the companies. The first corporation to live a difficult life in 
Libya was Chappaqua Oil, a recently formed American-owned company which just a 
few months earlier had managed to win a concession award. As an evidence of this, on 
October 28, 1969, the joint venture had been revoked, on grounds that the company 
lacked experience of prior petroleum operations required by Libyan law and that the 
contract had been made in an irregular manner, with the former government imposing 
the agreement on the Libyan General Petroleum Corporation.29 Nevertheless, the White 
House did not seem worried, for dozens of partially or totally US-owned companies 
were operating there, investing money for more than a billion dollars a year.30 The point 
was that only a very small part of Libyan oil was marketed in the United States, but 
almost the whole production was controlled by US companies. Therefore, the safeguard 
of American investments in that country was an absolutely primary interest for the 
Nixon Administration. To this purpose, it was profitable to establish good relations with 
the new regime, safeguarding at the same time European dependence on Libyan crude.31 
As an example of that, the European refining system was regulated according to the 
                                                 
28 See J. ANDERSON, Fiasco: The Real Story behind the Disastrous Worldwide Energy Crisis – Richard 
Nixon’s “Oilgate”, New York, NY, Times Books, 1983, p. 201. 
29 See Memorandum from James Placer to the Ambassador: Background to Chappaqua Dispute, October 
31, 1969, in NARA, RG 59, A1 5677, box 6, Lot 72D231, PET 6 Companies, Chappaqua Oil Company, 
Libya 1969, Confidential.   
30 See A Policy for Selective Import of Mid-East Oil, November 5, 1969, in NARA, RG 59, A1 5633, 
Records Relating to Saudi Arabia, 1955-1974, box 4, Saudi Arabia, Petroleum, General, 1969, 
Confidential.     
31 See Memorandum from Robert Behr and Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the 
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger): Paper on Possible Alternative Pressures 
on the Present Libyan Regime – Summary and Critique, November 20, 1969, Top Secret, in FRUS 1969-
1976, vol. E-5, part 2, doc. 44, in www.state.gov. 
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quality of the North African country’s crude;32 hence, in case of withdrawal of that 
product from the market, it became necessary to modify those facilities.33 In short, in 
order to safeguard its own economic interests Washington was obliged to deal with 
regimes located far from the American traditional sphere of influence. The huge oil 
revenues and the nationalist feeling which had turned a large part of North Africa into a 
socialist oriented block made Libya a potentially dangerous country for the West. The 
government, in fact, was by then able to exploit the rivalry among companies, since 
Tripoli already enjoyed such a financial position to implement a policy of 
nationalisation without severely harming its own interests, being able not to sell oil for 
about two years and at the same time carry on importing goods.34  
 
2. From Revolution to the First Breakthrough with Oil Companies  
The first strike to Western energy interests occurred in 1970. Only a few months after 
seizing power, Qaddafi in January began negotiations with a certain number of 
companies. Concerning this, the American intelligence service stated that the junta only 
aimed at securing higher posted prices on which government revenues were based, 
while the spectre of nationalisation, always the ultimate possibility, did not seem to 
enter the picture. Washington’s experts were confident that the Libyan commitment to 
purchase a sizable number of French aircraft and the promise to aid Egypt and Jordan 
made impossible for Tripoli to engage in adventurism in its oil arrangements.35 
However, despite conciliatory tones and the will to keep the complex price system then 
into force, the young dictator immediately showed himself ready to interrupt the oil 
flow, if the negotiations were not successful. As a matter of fact, the Libyan population 
                                                 
32 Sometimes, European interests collided with those of Western producing countries. For example, the 
Italian national oil company, ENI, had become the prime mover of Italian diplomacy towards Arab 
countries, leading to active support of the Algerian liberation war, as well as the close relation with 
Qaddafi’s Libya. See G. LUCIANI, Oil and Political Economy in the International Relations of the Middle 
East, in L. FAWCETT, ed., International Relations of the Middle East, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2009, p. 89. 
33 See Minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting; November 24, 1969, Top Secret, 
Sensitive, in FRUS 1969-1976, vol. E-5, part 2, doc. 45, in www.state.gov. 
34 See National Intelligence Estimate 36.5-69: Short-Term Prospects for Libya, December 30, 1969, 
Secret, Controlled Dissemination, in FRUS 1969-1976, vol. E-5, part 2, doc. 50, in www.state.gov. 
35 See Intelligence Memorandum 490/70: An Intelligence Assessment of Libya, February 13, 1970, Secret, 
Noforn, in FRUS 1969-1976, vol. E-5, part 2, doc. 53, in www.state.gov.  
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had so far lived for five thousand years without oil, and there was no difficulty in 
carrying on like that for a few more months in order to have national rights respected.36 
A number of adjustments were demanded, the most important of which was a price 
increase of forty cents a barrel. The request was immediately ejected by the companies, 
while James Akins of the State Department did not find anything outrageous in the 
Libyan demand, thus marking a break point between the Administration and oil 
corporations.37 A few years later, in his 1973 testimony to the US Senate on 
multinationals and foreign policy, the then Head of the Office of Fuels and Energy of 
the Department of State described the Libyan demands as quite reasonable, adding that 
his Office had come up with the same figures as the Libyan junta when calculating the 
quality/freight differential between Gulf and North African crude.38 What the Libyan 
Government requested, instead, was just a price equal to that of the crude coming from 
Nigeria, Algeria, and the Persian Gulf, respecting the difference in quality and costs of 
transport.39 This posture was strengthened by Colonel Qaddafi in person during a public 
speech in Bayda on April 8, when he stated that after having gained political freedom, 
Libya had to struggle for economic and industrial freedom as well and the 
multinationals were the rival this time, which represented the forces of imperialism 
against which Libyan people would claim their freedom issues.40 The young Colonel 
could afford such a radical attitude also because the Americans had no intention to 
jeopardise their diplomatic and commercial relations with Tripoli. In addition, the 
Nixon Administration had already decided to try to influence Libya to maintain its 
independence and develop its own resources primarily as a member of the 
Mediterranean area with strong ties to Western Europe. A policy like this was of course 
aimed at denying the development of intolerable Soviet or other communist presence in 
the country, including that exerted indirectly through other Arab radical States. In a 
                                                 
36 See M. CRICCO, Il petrolio dei Sedussi, p. 211. 
37 See BLAIR, The Control of Oil, p. 221. 
38 See I. SEYMOUR, OPEC: Instrument of Change, New York, NY, St. Martin’s Press, 1981, p. 67. 
39 See Libya Plans Unilateral Action on Prices if Talks Fail, in «Middle East Economic Survey», XIII, 
21, March 20, 1970. 
40 See Qadhafi’s Badya Rally Speech, 8 April 1970, in THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES (thereafter TNA), 
London, Kew, FCO 67/432, Oil Policy of Government of Libya, 01 Jan. 1970 - 31 Dec. 1970, ML 423/2 
part A, ME/3349/A/1.  
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word, Nixon and Kissinger hoped to use the US position in Libya to back regional 
stability in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, thus highlighting the importance of 
that country on the regional chessboard.41  
     An attempt to nationalise the oil industry did not appear likely, according to CIA 
estimates, but it could not be entirely ruled out. In such circumstances, Washington 
experts affirmed that an embargo to certain countries would be much more likely than 
nationalisation. In that case, a selective embargo would be relatively easy to circumvent, 
in view of many alternative sources of oil.42 In this scenario, the Libyan posture was 
further strengthened by the difficulties the Middle Eastern allies of the United States 
were living. For example, it was estimated that Saudi Arabia’s oil revenues would grow 
less than expected and in the previous three years foreign currency reserves had 
decreased from 950 to 750 million dollars.43 Despite this, the Nixon Administration had 
by then set its priorities and North Africa was not part of them. In that area Washington 
had above all negative interests, as for the White House it was important that no hostile 
power manage to become hegemonic there. Therefore, it was necessary to safeguard oil 
tanker roots and prevent the Soviets from strengthening their military position in the 
Mediterranean.44 In the meantime, the American embassy in Libya affirmed that the 
Government was working to shape the conditions necessary to establish some form of 
national control on the energy industry, which the companies would not be able to 
challenge. The point was that Tripoli was probably able to find alternative markets for 
the nationalised crude and this might be something breaking the balance the companies 
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had ever enjoyed previously.45 In light of this, it was evident that the military were 
working to reduce the power of the companies and the Americans did not know whether 
it was possible to trust them any longer. Despite complete nationalisation was still 
excluded, the Libyans were determined to put pressure on the companies, some of 
which were more vulnerable than others.46 The perfect victim to implement Qaddafi’s 
policies was Occidental, whose interests were entirely located in Libya and because of 
this they had no chance to compensate from other sources.47  
     By reading the most recent declassified documentation, it is interesting to know how 
different Congressional concern was from that of the Department of State. In fact, in 
late July 1970, while negotiations were on in Tripoli, Wilson Laird, Director of the 
Office of Oil and Gas in the Interior Department, briefed some Senators on the political 
and energy situation in the Middle East. From the following record we know that an 
interruption of the oil flow was contemplated as a possibility, though not the likeliest 
one. In that case, the Administration knew Western Europe and Japan would face a 
crushing economic crisis and the Europeans would search their own accommodation 
with the Arabs. Despite this, the Senators were not interested in the Middle East and 
only asked for US domestic capacity and the measures to take to insure non-dependence 
on Arab oil.48 Meanwhile, on July 5 the Revolutionary Command Council had 
nationalised the three main foreign companies operating in Libya, that is Esso Standard 
Libya’s Marketing Division, Shell Libya Ltd and Asseil Corporation. Apparently, the 
military’s decision was due to economic reasons and the need of raw material 
conservation. However, the fact that local press regarded that initiative as the first step 
towards the liberation of the Libyan economy from foreign domination was a kind of 
omen for the future. Moreover, despite the Minister of Mineral and Oil Resources, Izz 
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al-Din al-Mabruk, had declared that Tripoli had the duty to safeguard its natural 
resources and that only for this it had been necessary to take conservative measures, the 
companies had to realise that circumstances had changed and therefore they had better 
collaborate with the Government. Finally, the fact that in the same days Tripoli was 
stipulating a commercial agreement with Iraq and Algeria, with the purpose to 
harmonise their own energy policies, made easy to predict that Qaddafi’s regime did not 
exclude any political implication.49 Nevertheless, the Nixon Administration did not 
show any real opposition to the Colonel’s offensive, though he was starting to dismantle 
the system of control set up by the companies in the previous decades, that was formed 
of: a) control of production levels, in order to avoid the collapse of global tender; b) 
control of transport, in order to avoid the collapse of regional tender; c) control of 
international marketing, in order not to sell the raw material before it was expropriated; 
d) control of prices, in order to avoid accumulation of capital. With a system like that, 
until then producers had always been obliged to sell their product, while now Qaddafi 
was harming the companies’ power to establish output levels, while dealing with the 
Soviet Union to open new markets.50  
     Apart from this, CIA reports showed that Libya had reduced its dependence on 
Britain as concerned arms supplies, thus diversifying imports thanks to the French and 
Soviet market. If we think that on July 18 the Soviets had sent a certain number of tanks 
and ammunitions, it is not surprising that the American intelligence suspected that 
Moscow was using Libya to stock strategic arms destined to other buyers.51 Despite 
this, CIA analysts wrote that there was no particular reason why the United States had to 
worry about the junta’s policies, in a country whose oil production was controlled by 
American enterprises by eighty-eight per cent. After all, Washington interests’ core had 
not been damaged yet, the diplomatic and economic channels through which it was 
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possible to influence Tripoli were still active and the military themselves wanted access 
to scientific and technologic resources.52 It is by now evident that Nixon and Kissinger 
were ready to pay quite an expensive price to the policy of keeping the Libyan 
Government aligned to Western interests. In fact, US energy policies were not based on 
stability of prices so much, but rather on stability of supplies.53 As a consequence of 
this, a price increase was regarded as inevitable and the Ambassador in Libya said that 
if the Arabs acquired more decision power in the system of production, transport, and 
marketing, this would make easier for the West to deal with more responsible and 
reliable interlocutors.54  
     On September 2, Harmand Hammer, President of Occidental, was obliged to 
surrender to Qaddafi’s requests and sign a historic accord. Until then, in fact, industrial 
nations, multinational companies, and producers as well had been illuded about 
American energy surplus, able to provoke a price decrease and persuade producers not 
to augment output, thus seeking more profits by competing among themselves.55 The 
agreements implied a posted price increase from 2.23 to 2.53 dollars a barrel, beside 
another two-cent-increase for the following two years as a premium for the low sulphur 
percentage of the Libyan product. Finally, the companies’ income tax was shifted from 
fifty to fifty-eight per cent.56 Qaddafi had been clever to take advantage of favourable 
circumstances putting Libya at the centre of trading routes among wide and rich areas of 
the world. All this discreetly backed by the United States, which did not have any 
significant interests against the young dictator.57 What happened went beyond a mere 
increase of prices. The September agreements had altered the balance between 
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companies and producers, giving the latter a further chance to struggle for the control of 
their own raw materials. The oil industry, as it had been so far known, no longer existed, 
so much so that when signing the accords on behalf of Occidental, George Williamson 
stated that whoever drove a tractor, a lorry or any car in the Western world would be 
affected by what just occurred in Libya.58 For a while the majors tried to resist 
government pressure. In particular Esso, Mobil, BP, and Shell had initially refused to 
accept tax retroactive payment and posted price increase, on grounds of possible 
implications to their operations elsewhere, and particularly in the Persian Gulf, where 
most of their stake was. Moreover, Shell and BP had large production interests in 
Nigeria, with a most African nation clause, according to which any better terms applied 
to any other African government would be automatically applied to Nigeria.59 From 
British records we know that Shell took nearly one million barrels a day from Libya in 
1970. Overall speaking, the UK economy benefited from the two companies’ operations 
in that country in terms of ten to fifteen million pounds a year on the balance of 
payments, while twenty-five per cent of British oil requirements were being met from 
that source. Finally, the more and more aggressive policies the RCC was pursuing 
portrayed the future of Libya along the same path chosen by Iraq since the 
nationalisation of most BP concession areas in 1961,60 while at the same time the North 
African Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office warned that the first year 
of the revolution had been characterised by gross mismanagement of the economy and 
Anglo-Libyan trade had been reduced to a level half of pre- revolutionary times.61  
     At this point, it is important to remind the disagreement within the American 
Administration itself on the political implications of the oil power acquired by Arab 
producers. In fact, whereas the CIA agent Miles Copeland affirmed that the Arabs were 
already able to exercise substantial influence and do a lot of damage to Western 
European economy, thus confirming what James Akins had already stated a few months 
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previously, that is that the use of oil as a political weapon was a possibility to take into 
account, petroleum officers operating in Libya were still optimistic enough to exclude 
this option, for the Arabs had never showed to be so employed to a common cause.62 
Finally, the East-West rivalry gave Tripoli a further weapon to blackmail the West, so 
much so that not even the Americans objected that the process of Libyanisation of the 
oil industry was by then irreversible and that therefore it was necessary to find out a 
way for producers to at least participate in the control of their own natural resources, 
without harming US interests on the spot, amounting to 1.2 billion dollars and granting 
the balance of payments eight hundred million dollars a year. As a consequence of this, 
as a possible solution the setting up of joint ventures was suggested.63 Nevertheless, all 
producers had realised that the energy market was living a period of big change. Despite 
of the fact that the companies’ main interests were oriented towards the Persian Gulf 
and might have initially believed that Qaddafi’s action had been taken only to 
compensate lower freight costs, this was not the right explanation for the retroactive tax 
increase and the claim that prices had always been underestimated. Apart from this, 
Gulf producers had seen the effect of such a tough negotiation and had taken the logic 
conclusions. Finally, in a growing market Western goods were more and more 
expensive, and up to then there had not been an equivalent increase of raw materials’ 
price.64 In short, the repercussions of the September agreements were much more 
significant than their economic factor. As a matter of fact, Kissinger writes that the filter 
between producers and consumers had been eliminated, thus preventing companies 
from deciding a common price and provoking a leapfrogging effect between 
Mediterranean and Gulf producers. Nevertheless, although the increase had been rather 
high in terms of percentage, overall speaking the price was still quite below that of 
American crude. Consequently, the economic system of industrialised countries, largely 
founded on cheap and easily accessible oil, had not been affected yet, thus persuading 
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Western governments not to intervene in economic negotiations.65 To complete the 
picture, Philip Trezise and James Akins thought that the price increase by Gulf 
producers, though more than likely by then, would be reasonably limited. Therefore, it 
was useless to expect from the Administration any involvement in commercial 
questions.66 What is surprising is that Tresize himself had affirmed on September 24 
that within a decade the United States would consume up to twenty-four thousand 
barrels of crude a day, while domestic production in that moment was limited to about 
ten million barrels a day. Though it was theoretically possible for the Americans to 
reach self-sufficiency by enormously augmenting production and using alternative 
sources, this would be extremely expensive and the average tax payer would very 
unlikely accept it. Hence, increasing imports was the most realistic solution.67 In a 
word, times had changed and producers started to pay more attention to the power of 
decision and control on their natural resources. The point was, by then, that the 
producers’ choices were not always based on economic factors. The political aspect was 
paving the way to an ongoing confrontation between the North and the South of the 
world, while at the same time the Americans were worried about becoming within a few 
years a big importer of hydrocarbons.68  
 
3. The Nationalisation of British Petroleum Assets   
The price increase was not a serious problem for the Americans, who also admitted that 
producers were not wrong in reminding that the cost of oil in terms of purchasing power 
had even decreased in the previous years. Priority was always given to stability of 
supplies, which it was hoped it would safeguard the common interests of both producers 
and consumers. In spite of this, the Administration had realised that Libya was by then 
the key country of the whole system, as in case of interruption of the oil flow towards 
Western Europe, the United States would be requested to deviate part of the Western 
                                                 
65 See KISSINGER, Years of Upheaval, p. 862. 
66 See PETERSEN, Richard Nixon, Great Britain, pp. 35-36. 
67 See P.H. TRESIZE, The Outlook for Energy Supplies, in «The Department of State Bulletin», LXIII, 
1635, October 26, 1970, pp. 479-480.   
68 See Anglo/American Oil Discussion: Record of a Meeting Held at the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office on 3 December, 1970, December 3, 1970, in TNA, FCO 67/445, C399891, Confidential. 
Bruno Pierri 
 
74 
hemisphere’s production, which was something Washington could no longer afford 
without affecting domestic output. The White House’s optimism was due to the 
awareness that such a draconian measure would imply such an economic sacrifice that 
only Libya and Kuwait could up to then afford. Other producers, like Saudi Arabia, 
were thought to have too many financial interests abroad to be subjected to the 
consequences of a total interruption of oil trade.69 Concerning this, among the various 
tasks of the Administration there was also that of safeguarding the American 
enterprises’ stake in Libya, being aware that Tripoli did not get closer to the Soviet 
sphere of influence. In other words, the Americans aimed at keeping stable and cordial 
relations with producers, in order to avoid the risk of oil interruptions. As regarded the 
option for energy matters to become a pretext for diplomatic initiatives, it was of 
paramount importance to keep all negotiations on a strictly economic level. However, 
up to that moment there was no evidence that the hostility towards the Jewish State 
could trigger energy threats by producers, though the stalemate in peace negotiations 
did not help.70 According to American documentation, now that the military junta had 
completed the first stage of the revolution, its new directions and priorities were less 
clear, vacillating between feverish assaults and ambitious development plans with the 
aid of foreign involvement, while from a military point of view Tripoli was receiving 
arms both from the Soviets and the French.71 In any case, it is by now evident that 
Washington recognised complete Libyan sovereignty over the companies in that country 
and viewed petroleum negotiations as essentially a matter between the junta and the 
corporations, having being assured prior to US recognition of the revolutionary regime 
that the latter intended to carry out international obligations. Finally, the Libyan posture 
on Middle Eastern issues was of paramount importance for the Nixon Administration 
and during the negotiations the State Department recommended to inform the junta that 
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Washington sought a settlement honouring both sides of the conflict.72 After all, it is not 
surprising that the Americans were so concerned about the Mediterranean country, as at 
that moment seventeen US companies were operating there, accounting for almost 
ninety per cent of total production and having turned Libya into the fourth world largest 
exporter.73    
     On February 14, 1971, a new agreement was signed in Tehran with Gulf producers, 
according to whose terms taxation was immediately shifted to fifty-five per cent. 
Moreover, in case other producers had claimed higher requests, Gulf governments 
would not have limited the export of their crude, in order to allow consumers in case of 
emergency to replace Libyan oil with that of the Persian Gulf area.74 As a matter of fact, 
the most important outcome to achieve was stability of price and to this end Libya, 
which was proving to be the most radical negotiator, had to be isolated. As a 
consequence of this, both the majors and the independents had stipulated a parallel 
accord, stating that whoever were subjected to Libyan reprisals, would be aided with 
crude from other areas of the world at a similar, if not equal price. After all, the 
companies were not really concerned about a moderate price increase, provided this was 
applied to their competitors as well. It is also relevant that Nixon spoke about the 
exploitation of new energy sources, without any reference to prices. Even the majors’ 
executives recognised that in the recent past the price of raw materials had been too low 
compared with market laws.75 Last but not least, while the Tehran agreements had 
promised stability in pricing and taxation, they had made no reference about ownership. 
Concerning this, participation was interpreted by some oil companies as another form of 
aggressive move, but it could also be seen as a means of diverting aggression, whose 
best advocate was Libya, which had made no promise to avoid leapfrogging. Since the 
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conservative Saudis had decided to delegate the Mediterranean producers’ negotiations 
to the Libyans, there was practically no hope of moderation there.76  
     The next step was the negotiation with Mediterranean producers led by Libya, which 
had the intention to claim an expensive price for its “loyalty” to the West, so much so 
that the junta requested a price increase fifteen cents higher than the one reached in 
Tehran, plus another five per cent annually and a sixty-per-cent taxation, like in 
Venezuela.77 Regarding this, the British feared that an interruption in negotiations might 
provoke a real embargo by the Libyans, making Western Europe lose a sixth of its 
supplies.78 Such concern was due to the volume of trade Britain had with the North 
African country, not only in the energy field. In fact, London believed there was a 
serious threat of nationalisation of UK oil assets in Libya, affecting also commercial, 
monetary and arms trade interests. This because Tripoli possessed monetary reserves in 
Sterling Pounds amounting to six hundred million. Finally, the junta had already 
showed to be able to deal with French and Russian competitors, though it did not 
necessarily imply any rapprochement to Moscow.79 Unlike the Americans, the British 
were not so sure that oil questions would be limited to the economic sphere, bearing 
also in mind that it was pivotal not to deteriorate the relations between companies and 
European governments, in order not to jeopardise the process of membership of Britain 
to the European Community,80 especially when the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
saw a fifty-per-cent-chance of failure of the negotiations, thus paving the way to a 
procedure of nationalisation, if not of a real embargo.81 Actually, it was true that before 
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the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War Iraq, Algeria, and to a certain extent Libya, were 
taking the position that an at least partial nationalisation of foreign oil assets was the 
best economic and political antidote to the American support for Israel.82   
     In the meantime, on March 20 an agreement with Mediterranean producers was 
reached in Tripoli, then perfectioned and signed on April 2, through which the barrel 
price was shifted from 2.22 to 3.32 dollars and tax augmented to fifty-five per cent.83 
However, such an aggressive attitude shown by the Libyan military might have been a sort 
of prelude to a real nationalisation. In order for this to be avoided, and thus establishing a 
more collaborative relation between companies and producers, the Saudi Minister of 
Petroleum said that a compromise was necessary, and in particular a State participation to 
all activities dealing with the oil industry. In this way, he carried on, government interests 
would be bound to those of the companies, thus making easier to moderate the more 
radical regimes’ policies.84 The situation was so undefined that no one was so sure there 
would not be a leapfrogging effect. Kissinger in person warned the President that 
against a really profitable agreement for Mediterranean producers, the Shah would very 
unlikely manage to resist popular pressure to gain even better conditions.85 The April 
agreements granted the North African country two billion dollars a year of oil 
revenues86 and were also a starting point for further negotiations with Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, and Algeria.87 Such a financial surplus was becoming a threat to the 
international monetary system, though it was positive for the West that practically all 
exports of Libya dealt with crude oil and almost all of them went to Western Europe.88 
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However, the Foreign Office was not misled about the Libyan junta’s reliability, as the 
Minister of Oil himself had stated there would be no stability in that sector, unless 
companies invested in Libya much more than provided by the contract just signed.89 
Instead, the CIA was still excluding that for the following two years Tripoli would 
pursue a process of nationalisation, though in the future it would play a more and more 
pivotal role in the oil industry management. Moreover, the international dimension 
Libya was acquiring would sooner or later allow it to influence events in the Arab-
Israeli conflict, for example by funding Arab regimes directly involved in the 
confrontation,90 although the capitals which seemed to represent the real challenge came 
more from Riyadh and Baghdad, rather than from Tripoli.91 
     Shortly after the signature of the agreements, we know that the US embassy in 
Tripoli sent a report to the Office of North African Affairs of the State Department, 
through which the economic officer stated that Libya had not until then used oil as a 
political weapon because the government had not found a way to do so without 
damaging national interests. The point was, however, that Tripoli was thought it would 
do so if it ever found an acceptable way not to harm the country’s economy. 
Furthermore, after eighteen months since the revolution the American assessment was 
as follows: a) the Eastern Europeans’ role had not changed, as they were still working in 
Libya as construction contractors in order to gain foreign currency; b) the government, 
like at the times of the monarchy, was spending on both military and economic 
programmes, though its capacity to absorb investment was more limited than its 
financial resources; c) there was room for American contribution to Libyan 
development while avoiding government to government arrangements due the 
difference over Middle East policies.92  
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     As a matter of fact, during the first phase of the revolution the young officers were 
concerned the oil sector was still employing only one per cent of the active population 
of the country and produced social and economic effects not easily to reconcile with the 
egalitarian principles of the revolution itself. At the same time, the rulers knew that the 
technocratic nature of the oil industry left them no choice but to rely on any expertise 
available in the country, which for the majority came from foreign personnel. By 1970, 
Libya had one of the world’s most complex oil infrastructure systems; hence, under 
those circumstances the junta decided that nationalisation was not an option for the time 
being.93 Maybe it was for this reason that the British assessed the Libyan junta’s 
policies as evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, as up to then Tripoli had not 
followed the Algerian example of nationalisation. Instead, the real problem for the 
Libyans dealt with conservation of oil and re-investments of revenues. Therefore, 
London thought that in case of a new Middle Eastern crisis Tripoli would very luckily 
play a leading role.94 Moreover, the government had been clear in stating that it aimed 
at gaining technical, administrative, and financial control over the companies, though 
without any intention to alter the structure of the international oil industry.95 This was 
also a way for the government to control the economy and gain people’s confidence. 
Since a large share of the national income accrued directly to the State, in fact, a special 
responsibility for redistribution arose. Thus public employment was the favourite 
method of channelling oil revenues into the economy and most of the labour force was 
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on government payroll.96 In all this situation, it is rather shocking how the Americans 
ignored the ongoing warnings of nationalisation by a lot of producing countries. In fact, 
in any report on the problem of nationalisation the option that energy sources could be 
used for political purposes was always considered as a remote possibility, despite the 
threats coming both from radical regimes, like Iraq, and reliable friendly allies like the 
Shah.97 Despite all this, the State Department was always predicting a period of trading 
stability after the signature of the agreement.98 However, the impact of these changes was 
estimated by Walter Levy, who in that Summer published an article calculating that 
revenues of oil exporting countries would raise up to more than eighteen billion dollars 
within 1975, and that Europe’s bill would rise by more than five billion in the same 
period. The terms of world trade had radically changed, reaching “hurricane 
proportions”.99 This created a potentially unstable new source of liquidity in the form of 
excess reserves short-term funds held by oil States, the so called petro-dollars, which 
made the international monetary system much more unstable.100          
     Having said this, the importance of Libya for the United States was not to be seen 
only in bilateral terms, but also in the wider context of American interests in the area, 
which included: 1) European dependence on Libyan oil production and US companies 
as suppliers, against the unpredictable character and aggressive policies of the regime; 
2) increased Soviet influence in the Mediterranean, combined with reduced Western 
influence since the 1969 coup; 3) Libya’s militant Arab nationalist posture within the 
Arab-Israeli conflict; 4) evolving nature of intra-Arab relations. Over the five following 
years the Administration had of course set the task to maintain oil flow towards Western 
Europe, preferably through American intermediaries, which at the same time would 
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assure a continued return from the Libyan Government to the US balance of payments. 
Equally important was a moderation of Libya’s foreign policy, especially with respect 
to the Middle East. That was why, in short, a constructive attitude towards the North 
African country was advisable.101 As regarded the relations between Libya and Britain, 
the Foreign Office framed two reasons why the Mediterranean country could ever act 
against British oil supplies or interests. First of all, the political motives either in 
support of an Arab cause, or of Libyan negotiating positions outside the oil business. 
Then, economic motives were possible, allowing the Government to threaten to act in 
an attempt to increase their oil revenues or acquire greater control over oil operations. 
After all, UK reports said that an embargo against Britain alone would have virtually no 
effect upon the availability of supplies to London, while an action in the form of 
expropriation of BP and Shell’s interests in Libya would hurt and had to be rated as a 
serious risk, despite of the fact that the two companies operated in partnership with US 
enterprises.102 Most companies were determined to resist all change until it was forced 
on them, though they did generally recognised that change was by then inevitable. 
However it was, the companies’ attitude was not always the same. After a series of talks 
Akins had had with corporation executives, we know that some, like Texaco, 
maintained that there should be no change whatsoever, while others, like Mobile, 
thought that once OPEC countries started the path towards meaningful involvement and 
control of all oil operations, they would not be satisfied until they achieved at least a 
fifty-one-per-cent participation. To tell the truth, this was easily acceptable by all 
counsellors of Nixon’s, for Walter Levy questioned whether the US Government could 
ever permit control of most Eastern hemisphere production by local regimes. In case of 
another Vietnam like war, for example, would foreign and volatile governments allow 
oil supplies to the US fleet? In a word, becoming less and less self-sufficient in the 
future, the Americans had thus to become more and more aware of this security aspect 
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while coping with energy matters.103 Due to some independent companies’ contracts in 
other parts of Africa, such a radical measure was not so difficult to achieve for the 
Libyans. As an evidence of that, the Nigerians were pressing Occidental for fifty-per-
cent government ownership and management control over concession, should oil be 
found. If Occidental accepted, the Department of State affirmed, it would be practically 
impossible not to give in to the same demands by the Libyans. And once Occidental 
surrendered in Libya, the way would be paved for other companies to follow the 
precedent.104 Levy himself wrote in «Foreign Affairs» that participation was a sort of 
grand design to bind the interests of the oil companies, predicting also that they would 
become subservient to their host governments. Therefore, multinationals had to face a 
major decision:  
 
«To what extent and for how long they can be held hostage by their resource 
interests in producing countries…It should now be recognised that their position 
[…] depends on a closer relationship and better understanding with consuming 
governments».105  
        
     The strike that stroke the camel’s back was the implementation of the British 
withdrawal from the Persian Gulf area, which had been decided a few years earlier. The 
decision had triggered off a series of regional rivalries, especially between Arabs and 
Persians, which could have undermined the Shah’s personal prestige. Having accepted 
the independence of Bahrein, he absolutely claimed sovereignty over Abu Musa and the 
Tunbs islands, and London could do nothing but accept the fait accompli.106 The 
American attitude was completely oriented to favour Iran. Therefore, having a military 
strong, politically stable and reliable ally in that part of the world perfectly matched US 
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interests.107 On November 30, 1971, Iranian troops landed on the shores of Abu Musa 
and Tunbs islands and occupied part of the territory. Before the landing, London had 
warned on a possible negative Arab reaction, and in fact Kuwait, Syria and Iraq 
protested.108 By exploiting as a pretext the occupation, on December 7 Qaddafi 
nationalised all properties and assets of British Petroleum Exploration Company. In this 
way, not only Tripoli hit the interests of the company, but also those of the British 
Government, since Downing Street had a fifty-per-cent stake in the corporation. Hence, 
the military junta gained ownership of one of the most important oil export systems and 
at the same time gave a warning to American enterprises. What was particularly 
worrying was that British Petroleum worked on a joint venture regime with Nelson 
Bunk Hunter from Texas, though American reactions were not extremely alarmed, as it 
did not seem that the military aimed at acting against other Western companies.109 To 
add preoccupation in London, however, there was the Libyan manoeuvre to sell their 
own deposit of ninety million pounds stocked in the British Treasury. This was 
probably only a way to show disappointment towards the British posture on the Persian 
action, but it was better not to ignore the possibility that the withdrawal of financial 
reserves was a kind of preliminary action to a further challenge to the companies.110 
     The American embassy thought the companies in Libya had by then only two 
choices: either getting ready for some form of participation, or eventual nationalisation. 
Everything else, the report stated, would leave the initiative in the hands of a producing 
country with huge financial resources. Therefore, it was becoming urgent to move 
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quickly towards a new kind of relationship.111 To tell the truth, by reading US 
documentation it is difficult to understand why Washington’s officers were so 
optimistic. In fact, some American companies, such as Occidental Petroleum and Esso, 
had received a warning letter stating that the Libyans would resort to administrative 
control of property and revocation of concessions should the company not pay the full 
amount the government considered due, though no deadline had been set.112 The 
nationalisation of British Petroleum did not affect any direct American interest. 
However, the nationalisation decree gave the junta the right to conclude sales contracts 
and market production overseas from the whole concession, included the portion 
belonging to Bunker Hunt. In any case, operations were not likely to continue normally, 
as foreign technicians previously working for BP could always refuse to work for the 
new Libyan company set up to run the concession. Secondly, BP might have tried to 
fight the nationalisation, thus involving Occidental in the dispute. Finally, Libyan oil 
was by then overpriced compared with alternate sources of crude. In order to market the 
nationalised oil, therefore, the government could have been tempted to shade the market 
price, thus reducing Bunker Hunt’s profits as well. Instead, as concerned monetary 
effects, the transfer of Libyan funds from London to New York, and the consequent 
conversion from Sterlings into Dollars, could of course have positively affected the US 
balance of payments. The most important achievement for the Libyans, however, was 
the chance to acquire technical expertise to manage an oil company and market crude 
abroad. In case it were successful, the Department of State affirmed, they might be 
expected to look around for other companies, including American ones, and extend the 
use of oil to the diplomatic field.113 On the other hand, Washington did not want the 
Libyans to market nationalised oil. Concerning that, three days after the nationalisation 
decree London had requested American support to persuade the main consumers not to 
purchase Libyan crude and at the same time to condemn any use of that as a political 
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blackmail. As a matter of fact, London’s request did not convince State Department 
officers, as American companies themselves were asking the Administration not to 
intervene against such an emotional military junta, once the British had nothing more to 
lose in that country, while retaliation towards American corporations was always 
possible. However, not to follow the European allies bore a higher risk than the 
contrasts with Tripoli. Therefore, Washington decided to discreetly back the British 
demand.114  
     White House decisions were also influenced by studies saying a serious energy crisis 
was unlikely. At the most, it was supposed to be limited to Libya, but certainly, it was 
stated, Gulf producers would not back such radical positions.115 We also have to 
remember that there were tensions between Libya and other OPEC members. In 1971 the 
North African country had gained great economic advantage, but its leadership within 
OPEC was debated. In fact, the Shah strongly criticised Qaddafi’s aggressive oil policies, 
which he accused were destabilising the market. Instead, Saudi Arabia had a prudent 
attitude towards the Libyan leader, but at the same time there was a sort of admiration 
for the man who was vigorously challenging the companies.116 The task of the West, 
after all, was to retain continued access to oil reserves, even if the companies had lost 
control over them. If that required higher prices of participation agreements, American 
officers said the Administration should be ready to accept those changes. On one hand, 
not every analyst in Washington thought the Administration’s interests differed from 
those of the companies. James J. Blake, for example, said the government had to 
support oil companies in their dealings with producers. At the same time, new domestic 
resources had to be exploited and shut in for emergencies. Finally, in late 1971 few in 
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the Nixon Administration believed that participation might be delayed until the 
expiration of the Tehran Agreements in 1976. Everything depended on how successful 
Libya could be in getting a meaningful agreement with the companies. In that case, 
pressures on Persian Gulf producers to demand the same would be irresistible.117            
 
4. The Long Path to the Nationalisation of American Assets 
Actually, at the beginning of 1972 Downing Street was not so concerned about the loss 
of facilities in Libya, as it was basically essential to keep the solidarity of other 
companies operating in the Middle Eastern area, unlike what had occurred in 1970.118 
Compared with other companies, British Petroleum had a higher stake in the 
participation issue. Therefore, it was better to carefully negotiate in Libya before 
reaching any agreement, in order not to set a dangerous precedent on the question of 
compensation. Instead of accepting such a risk, it was less hurting to lose all profits in 
Libya, as they represented around five per cent of all BP total supplies.119 As concerned 
American majors, rather contrary to the principle of participation, Akins warned that the 
Libyan Government could always retaliate against US oil interests due to Washington’s 
pro-Israeli policies. No one, by then, could deny NATO countries’ growing dependence 
on Middle Eastern and Northern African sources and this was something the White 
House could no longer ignore in international questions.120 At the same time, the same 
officer was starting speaking about an impeding oil embargo demanding an urgent 
reform of the whole energy sector.121 From this point of view, the Americans were 
studying the possibility for most oil to be controlled by hostile actors aiming at using it 
as a political weapon. Moreover, the State Department predicted that in the near future 
                                                 
117 See James J. Blake to Mr. Smith: Thoughts on Oil, December 21, 1971, in NARA, RG 59, A1 5677, box 
6, PET 2, Oil Studies, Libya 1971, Confidential.  
118 See J.R.A. Bottomley to the Permanent Under-Secretary: LONRHO and Libya, January 5, 1972, in TNA, 
FCO 39/1111, Nationalisation of BP Oil Company on Libya, 1971 Jan. 01 - 1972 Dec. 31, NAL 16/1, part 
A, Secret.   
119 See A.J.M. Craig to J.P. Tripp: Libya/BP, January 31, 1972, in TNA, FCO 39/1111, NAL 16/1, part A, 
Confidential. 
120 See Oil: Meeting at State Department, January 5, 1972, in TNA, FCO 67/759, Oil Affairs in United 
States of America, 1972 Jan. 01 - 1972 Dec. 31, ML 304/1, Confidential. 
121 See R. GRAF, Making Use of the “Oil Weapon”: Western Industrialized Countries and Arab Petro-
politics in 1973-1974, in «Diplomatic History», XXX, 1, January 2012, p. 191.  
The United States and Revolutionary Libya, 1968-1973 
 
87 
black gold availability would be reduced and consumers would compete with one 
another to get access to it.122 The problem was that such a de facto nationalisation, being 
the participation long term goal set at fifty-one per cent, would have turned the 
companies into mere management and marketing organisations, consequently leading to 
unilateral decisions on prices. According to what Kissinger reminds, the risk of 
expropriation was a serious obstacle to American interests, as it could turn any 
disagreement into a governmental dispute.123     
     At this point, while other producers were negotiating on participation, Libya had 
decided to steadily reduce production. One reason for this was the timing, as Tripoli 
could not afford to use all its oil revenues then, but it needed to stretch out production 
from its limited reserves for as long as possible, until alternate sources of income could 
be developed. Another reason was conservation, for a few geologists believed 
companies were producing too fast before 1970 and that more oil could be recovered if 
produced at a lower rate. Moreover, beyond the amount of oil required to generate 
enough revenue, oil was worth more in the ground to wait more profitable prices in the 
future. In fact, in May 1972 James Akins believed the world price for crude for years 
afterwards would be about 3.50 dollars a barrel and five or six dollars by 1980.124 
Interesting enough, scholars in this period argued that it could become more attractive 
for companies to buy crude from national oil companies rather than to produce it by 
themselves. This, they hoped, could finally lead to competition among national 
companies which would in time drive the price down. Professor Stauffer of Harvard 
added that the United States had to take a hard look at how much they were willing to 
pay for security of oil supplies. At the same time, Akins said that within five years the 
financial reserves of oil States would probably exceed ten billion dollars, so that a 
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certain number of them could afford temporary or long term restrictions to 
production.125 
     As concerned Libya’s foreign attitude, we must never forget that the Americans were 
always looking at the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern area through the lenses of a 
Cold War power. Therefore, they could do nothing but welcome the fact that Qaddafi 
was preoccupied with Soviet influence in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria and aimed at 
minimising that. After the December nationalisation, the Libyans had been probably 
forced to sell crude to the Soviets far below the market price, but they always pursued 
the reduction of Russian influence in the area, while at the same time being frustrated by 
the lack of hostilities against Israel. Apart from this, the State Department did not really 
believe a procedure of nationalisation of US companies in Libya was profitable for the 
North African country, for production would drop sharply and might stay down for a 
long time if output in Persian Gulf continued at usual level. However, the threat of 
nationalisation could be much more successful with independents with no other 
production outside Libya. By reading documents like this, we realise why the 
Administration did not appear really hostile towards the Libyan regime. After all, the 
Colonel was part of a scenario where the main American purpose was always the 
containment of the Soviet Union and Washington’s policy makers could not ignore that 
most of Qaddafi’s public ire and concern had been recently been directed at the Soviet 
menace in the Levant, rather than at American arms shipments to Israel.126 Finally, 
when considering to nationalise oil fields, government leaders were divided on the 
question of allowing the Soviets to help run the operations.127 In a few words, George 
Joffé reminds us that the ideological principles leading Libya’s foreign policy after the 
revolution were essentially two. First of all, soon after the coup the regime was 
following a Nasserist like path of pan-Arabism; and secondly, revolutionary Libya had 
to be a non aligned and anti-imperialist State. All this was quite wide spread in Arab 
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countries and it fitted to the temper of the times. But in 1972 the cultural revolution was 
ushering the second stage of development, which was implemented the following year 
by universalising and altering both principles. In short, instead of being primarily 
concerned with Arab nationalism and bringing the Arab world into a single political 
unity, Libya began to argue for political unity alone, mainly among Muslim peoples, not 
only Arabs. This implied that the Libyan system be replicated and anti-imperialism be 
an active response to the Western-dominated world. However, it was also true that 
energy security interests obliged Libya to seek continuous access to international 
markets, without which it could not gain the economic rent on which its society 
depended. Therefore, Tripoli shared a parallel interest with consumers, especially from 
Western Europe, though the Americans supplied the necessary technology. As a matter 
of fact, Libyan political radicalism depended on the ability to finance the ideological 
experiment through abundant oil revenues, which in a way bound the country to the 
West.128 This analysis seems corroborated by Libyan leaders’ statement threatening the 
intention to use oil as a political weapon, though no precipitous action was on the 
agenda.129  
     It was only a question of timing, but by then everybody knew the objective was full 
control over the oil industry. In the meantime, Tripoli was thought to press the 
companies to obtain maximum financial returns. Political problems, reports said, would 
arise for any company doing business in Libya, but at that time the Nixon 
Administration did not want to change the arms supply policy towards that country, as a 
decision to deliver what the junta requested, such as F-5 jets, could grow their 
expectations and cause problems it was better to avoid.130 Intelligence reports in 1972 
indicated that Libya might be already preparing to nationalise one or more of the 
thirteen US companies working there and accounting for ninety per cent of the whole 
Libyan production. What was consistent with this policy was Qaddafi’s dissatisfaction 
                                                 
128 See G. JOFFÉ, Prodigal or Pariah? Foreign Policy in Libya, in VANDERWALLE, Libya since 1969, cit., 
pp. 195-197. 
129 See Memorandum from Robert H. Pelletreau to James J. Blake: Libya – Jallud Meeting with Oil 
Company Executives, June 9, 1972, in NARA, RG 59, A1 5677, box 6, Petroleum Studies, Libya 1972, 
Confidential. 
130 See Talking Points: US-Libyan Relations, undated, in NARA, RG 59, A1 5677, box 6, Petroleum 
Studies, Libya 1972, Secret.  
Bruno Pierri 
 
90 
with American policy in the Middle East. Moreover, the fact that the Administration 
had authorised the Italians to sell Libya arms and ammunitions which Washington 
controlled through production licenses had not lessened the Libyan Government’s 
resentment against American restrictive arms policy. However it was, the Department of 
State said nationalisation of the oil industry would be a severe blow to American 
interests, affecting a one-billion-dollar industrial sector. Loss of that oil, together with 
the shutdown of the Iraq Petroleum Company which had already taken place, would 
almost certainly force European consumers to come to terms with Libya and Iraq, thus 
bypassing companies and discounting any US official position, beside strengthening the 
path to nationalisation in other areas of the world. Particularly important, to conclude, 
was to avoid any linkage between arms supplies and oil policy in the Libyan mind, in 
order not to be blackmailed on that.131 To tell the truth, the Libyan executive was 
already blackmailing companies, for Prime Minister Jallud said that their position was 
jeopardised because of the US refusal to provide arms, especially those already agreed 
to be sold at the times of the monarchy.132   
     The question by then was whether the Libyans could successfully nationalise 
American companies because the Europeans would be forced by supply restrictions to 
purchase nationalised crude. At the moment the answer was no, as the tanker and supply 
situation was still sufficiently flexible for Europe to get along without Libyan oil for an 
extended period of time. But the problem was that the Libyans were still able to 
nationalise for political reasons part or all of US oil companies.133 In a word, the option 
to link energy matters to politics was much more than an idea by then. The Libyan 
revolutionary Government was already linking the two issues. This did not mean that 
the two governments did not have regular talks, during one of which Qaddafi confirmed 
the non-aligned position of Libya. On the other hand, he said, the junta was under 
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pressure to find accommodation with the Soviet Union. Referring to the theory 
according to which there was a Jewish-Christian conspiracy to overcome the Islamic 
world, the Ambassador objected to the Department of State that Qaddafi was an 
obsessed man, a curious mixture of the seventh century Islamic Bedouin warrior and the 
modern idealistic nationalist.134 Only a few months later, the Colonel issued the Green 
Book, outlining his plans for a Muslim “cultural revolution”. Apart from critique of 
imperialism and the focus on Arab socialism, what stood forth was the “Third Universal 
Theory”, claiming that by returning to the fundamentals of Islam Libyans could lead 
fellow Muslims everywhere along a “Third Way” towards economic development and 
political change rejecting both capitalism and communism.135 As a matter of fact, in late 
1972 discriminatory actions were expected in Libya against American interests. 
Embassy reports said measures might include a special tax on oil companies, a partial 
boycott of American goods and services, and reduction of embassy staff. Moreover, 
Tripoli could press other Arab governments to follow suit and start a campaign against 
US interests.136      
     A precedent of paramount importance was set through the joint venture agreement 
between Libya and Agip, providing Tripoli an immediate fifty-per-cent participation 
share, that is twice as much as Gulf States claimed. Such a partnership allowed Libya to 
strengthen its position in the international petroleum industry and paved the way to 
other negotiations with British and American companies.137 To confirm this, the 
military junta immediately tried to induce the Oasis Group to accept the same terms as 
agreed upon by ENI, that is, apart from the participation share, compensation based at 
net book value and the marketing of Libyan half production upon request, paying the 
government a price half way between the tax paid cost and the posted price. These terms 
were not acceptable for US companies, first of all because Persian Gulf countries were 
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only asking for an initial twenty-five per cent share. In second place, US companies had 
been operating in Libya for several years by then and the net book value of their 
concession was much smaller than that of AGIP-ENI, which had not started production 
yet. Finally, the half-way price was at or above the market price and this meant that 
American companies would make no profit on that part of the production marketed in 
that way. On the other hand, ENI produced little crude of its own, making profits by 
refining and marketing oil, plus a preferential place in the Italian market.138 
Furthermore, dollar devaluation did not help, as its impact was particularly hard on a 
country like Libya, receiving dollars for much of its exports and mainly importing from 
non-dollar countries.139 That was also why in mid 1973 participation at twenty-five, or 
even fifty per cent, was outdated for the Libyans, who were now asking for total 
ownership at net book value compensation. Once more, the smaller companies were 
practically obliged to accept, in order to avoid disruption of their supplies, while 
countries like France and Italy were not so reliable in collaborating with a hard line on 
the Anglo-American part.140 To tell the truth, against the decree of nationalisation issued 
on June 11 by the Libyan Government, affecting for the moment only Nelson Bunker 
Hunt, the Nixon Administration did not adopt any tough line, as several options were 
regarded as too drastic. Multilateral consultations with other OECD countries were on 
the agenda, but this could never be worrying for the Libyans. Other measures, such as 
freezing Libyan assets in the United States, or suspending all exports to that country 
would only damage American interests and citizens still working there, beside 
provoking a hostile reaction. After a long discussion, the best piece of advice the 
American policy makers could give the President was not discouraging companies from 
making any reasonable agreement as they could, in order to ensure the continued flow 
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of Libyan oil to the United States.141 The juridical pretext to nationalise the small 
company had been that the concession had not been released to the company, but to its 
owner in person, which did not match national legislation.142     
     The risk of interruption of the oil flow was higher than ever, for two of the main 
exporters, that is Libya and Iraq, were on an anti-West stand, while Gulf moderate 
regimes were too sensitive to domestic radical pressure. What was more, we also have 
to bare in mind that the Arabs were obsessed with the Zionist issue and debated more 
and more on the political use of their oil wealth. Finally, foreign currency reserves were 
so many to allow them to carry on living even without energy exports, though only for a 
short span of time.143 As concerned the United States in particular, in 1972 less than 
three per cent of imports came directly from Libya. Despite this, it was not possible to 
ignore that Libyan oil strategically affected the American balance of payments and the 
stability of any agreement stipulated elsewhere.144 But the North African country was 
also a growing market for Britain, being by then the main Arab commercial partner.145 
At this point, there was a divergence of interests between the Administration and the 
companies, ready to accept ongoing price increases in order to keep access to oil 
supplies.146 It seemed this thesis was supported by the participation agreement at fifty-
one per cent signed on August 11 between Occidental Oil Company and the Libyan 
Government, followed five days later by the one stipulated with the Oasis Group, which 
included increase of price up to 4.90 dollars a barrel. What looked particularly worrying 
was the fact that prices and production levels would be unilaterally decided by the 
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military junta, thus jeopardising all previous agreements.147 Regardless of the US 
Government’s view, Libya had already indicated to other companies that they might 
incur in the same kind of legislation, thus threatening an embargo of oil supplies to the 
United States in case of refusal.148 The deadline was set on August 25 and the majors 
requested that the Administration at least announce that it would embargo from entry 
into the United States any crude illegally expropriated. However, the situation was not 
so simple, as any action like that, experts said, would affect the relations with other 
producers. And then, it could not be taken for granted that the Europeans would prevent 
Libyan oil from entering their own market, keeping in mind certain countries’ 
dependence on Libyan low-sulphur crude.149 Moreover, from a legal point of view it 
was argued that such a measure had no precedent, as it had been applied mainly to alien 
enemy property and communist trade transactions, while at the same time the trend was 
to liberalise imports, not to restrict them, especially those referring to low-sulphur crude 
the United States needed as well.150 
     On September 1, 1973, Qaddafi had another nationalisation decree issued, this time 
concerning natural gas and derivatives of five major and several lesser companies.151 
Curiously enough, seven months after that day, Hunt Vice President, Schuler, testified 
before the US Senate that the collapse of the old concession system in Libya had not 
resulted from actions by the major oil companies. Rather, he said, they had been willing 
to live up to their obligations far more readily than the independents. To tell the truth, 
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no other course was left open to foreign corporation in Libya.152 At this point, it was 
obvious for American intelligence to debate about the possibility of an oil embargo, but 
such an option was always regarded as extremely unlikely, except in case of another 
Arab-Israeli conflict. But the CIA excluded this event for another two or three years! 
Besides, an embargo against European countries with a neutral, if not pro-Arab posture, 
was considered even less probable. The most plausible hypothesis, instead, was that in 
the future Qaddafi might implement a total embargo against the United States, though 
none of the two countries would be seriously harmed.153    
 
 
 
Conclusions      
A few days after the nationalisation decree, almost all majors made public their calls for 
arbitration in accordance with former concession agreements, on grounds that the new 
piece of legislation would cause them even more trouble elsewhere. However, 
everything was useless, as in late September the government announced the setting up 
of committees to discuss compensation. As a matter of fact, this apparent carrot served 
as confirmation that the nationalisation was now irreversible. At last, the companies had 
to accept the new situation, pressed as they were by the Libyans and in some cases by 
their own national authorities. Nevertheless, the British still observed that Libyan oil 
policy had been up to then economically, rather than politically motivated. Qaddafi 
himself said that the September 1 decree had had only the purpose to break the power of 
foreign monopolies in Libya and gain control of national assets and resources, thus 
ensuring a genuine non aligned position. At the same time, however, he added that the 
political use of oil would be next in Libya’s foreign policy, while Jallud had stated that 
oil was a legitimate weapon in the Arab fight against colonialism. Although British 
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analysts still thought that the Mediterranean country could not afford a long and total 
interruption of crude supplies, a political gesture could no longer be excluded, either to 
teach the Americans a lesson, or to regain the initiative in oil matters from the 
moderates.154 As concerned American companies, they were practically obliged to 
accept the terms of the participation agreement, as the Administration did not think it 
was profitable to make public the note sent to the Libyan Government denouncing the 
takeover. In fact, we can read on the newly declassified records that, while companies’ 
representatives thought it was then the time to put maximum pressure to the Libyans to 
persuade them to reach an agreement with foreign corporations, Department of State 
policy makers affirmed that any sort of public action by the White House was more 
likely to push the Libyans and Arab public opinion towards even more damaging steps 
against the companies. According to the documentation available, the truth is that the 
Americans did not regard the Libyan regime as irrational. It had already been 
demonstrated that a compromise was always possible in private government-company 
negotiations, and this was much more likely in absence of US public pressure. After all, 
if the companies wanted to carry on doing business in Libya, it was better for them to 
avoid any public interference by Washington and not to narrow their chances to reach 
acceptable compromises.155 However, the contrary was also true, since at first President 
Nixon raised the spectre of Mossadeq, warning Libya that oil without a market did not 
do a country much good. This time the companies had to inform the President that the 
good old days had gone and Libyan production was not so easy to replace.156         
     Through the accomplishment of the de facto nationalisation of the oil industry, and 
on the eve of the Yom Kippur War and the consequent quadrupling of prices associated 
to the oil embargo, Libya stood at an important crossroads. Qaddafi and the RCC seemed 
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really interested in mobilising the population for the country’s political and economic 
development and in pursuing a long term economic policy. Moreover, they had almost 
overnight come into possession of the physical and economic resources allowing them 
to extraordinarily shape the process. The revolutionary regime aimed also at putting the 
State in charge of all economic activity, thus assuming the leadership among Arab 
radical regimes and competing within OPEC with Gulf producers.157 What happened 
between 1970 and 1973 in Libya clearly demonstrated the extent of structural change 
that had taken place in the oil industry and which reduced uncertainties for producing 
countries. First of all, strategic control replaced revenue as their primary objective and 
increased the probability of country-company conflict. Secondly, technological, 
administrative and managerial skills of producers enormously increased along with 
access to sharing of information and expertise. The Libyans had also been clever to 
court independent companies for the initial explorations and development of their 
territory and recognising their bargaining power was much easier with them than with 
the majors.158    
     In conclusion, recently declassified records show that the young Libyan dictator did 
not receive any tough opposition by the Nixon Administration during his first years in 
power. After all, the Americans had accepted that producers acquire control of their 
natural resources, and all they regarded as primarily strategic was continued access to 
Middle Eastern energy sources. Though an oil embargo was taken into consideration in 
all intelligence studies and reports, it had always been estimated as an extremely remote 
possibility. Moreover, the West hoped that Qaddafi would become a stronghold against 
a possible Soviet expansion, or at least a limit to Russian influence in the area at issue. 
Therefore, it became important not to provoke the susceptibility of the regime. None of 
the records analysed for this research has given evidence that the Nixon Administration 
had the intention to harm the newly born Arab Republic and even the socialist society 
Qaddafi was setting up did not represent at first a threat to American interests. After all, 
US and Western companies in general were never expelled from Libya, whose market 
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was growing more and more towards Western Europe, while American technology and 
capitals were never replaced with those of the Soviet Union. In a few words, the records 
say that the White House did not change the assessment of the first days of the 
revolution. The republican regime had been immediately recognised and, though well 
placed in the radical field and clearly anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist, a break of 
diplomatic relations was never contemplated. Each time someone suggested a course of 
action rather hostile to the Libyans, such as retaliation against the military’s aggressive 
policies and threats to Israel, this option was always excluded as non profitable to 
American interests. All this shows that in the first four years of the revolution the 
Americans were trying to “contain” Qaddafi’s regime within the orbit of an economic 
challenge in the oil market, while taking advantage of his ideology to build a dam 
against the Soviets, who were the real target of Nixon’s Twin Pillars Policy.
  
